In a previous blog
post I said that the two sides in the conflict raging now in Palestine,
Israel and Lebanon are:
#1. Ordinary people of all religions and ethnic groups in Palestine/ Israel/
Lebanon who want to live in peace with one another as equals (the opposite of
Zionism's Jewish privilege and apartheid.) This is the vast majority of people
of all ethnic and religious persuasions.
#2. Those who are, or want to be, ruling upper classes, who want inequality, and
who want to control ordinary people by setting them against each other along
religious/ racial/ ethnic lines as mutual mortal enemies.
These are the actual two sides. Obviously powerful governments and various
leaders want to disguise this conflict as a religious or ethnic or national
conflict, and they have unfortunately succeeded in that effort to a great
extent.
But to stop the blood bath hell that side #2 is raining down on side #1 today,
we need to start by at least imagining what a war waged by side #1 against side
#2 would even look like.
Violence or non-violence?
Side #1 cannot win by trying to persuade side #2 to stop its attacks. The
leaders of side #2 believe their cause is right, they lose no sleep feeling
guilty about the atrocities they carry out to control people, and while some
individuals may defect from this class, this class itself will never be
persuaded that they are wrong. Relying on persuasion
of one's opponent is what the philosophy
of non-violence is all about, and that is why it won't work. Violence,
per se, cannot be ruled out as a
necessary factor for side #1 to prevail.
But persuasion of one's potential friends
is, along with violence against side #2, also a necessary factor for success,
and pursuing this vital objective is not at all the same thing as adopting the
philosophy of non-violence.
What would it look like if Hamas and Hezbollah were fighting 100% for side #1
against side #2, in other words if they were fighting the class war?
Their strategy would be first, to persuade all potential friends in the world to
support them, by clearly explaining that they were fighting for side #1 aims and
against side #2 aims. The violence used by Hamas and Hezbollah would always be
subordinate to its political strategy, of uniting ordinary Arabs and Jews and
others around a common program of equality, security and mutual support for all.
In keeping with this strategy they would direct violence exclusively against
combatants (as opposed to non-combatants) on side #2, in order to focus all
their military power on the real target, and to avoid helping side #2 gain
political strength by disguising the true nature of the conflict as a religious
war.
What would class war violence look like for
Hezbollah?
Hezbollah has acquired serious weapons including rockets that they can fire,
albeit with very little precision, into Israeli towns. These weapons are good
for killing random non-combatants. But the weapons they would be trying to get
if they were waging the class war would be, on the contrary, weapons designed to
attack combatants. They would be using artillery that could be aimed with
precision at combatants. An anti-tank gun is the kind of weapon they would be
trying to get their hands on, not a long range missile. [It
appears Hezbollah
already has anti-tank weapons and is using them.]
Instead of trying to make side #2 back down by attacking civilians in side #1
who live in Israel (as if side #2 cared about "their own" people, which they
clearly do not) , Hezbollah's strategy would be to take control of Israeli land
adjacent to the Lebanon border, by fighting Israeli military forces for that
land with weapons designed for that purpose. If Hezbollah succeeded in capturing
some Israeli land, they would make it a point to treat the Israeli civilians in
that land respectfully, as potential friends who potentially shared their side
#1 aim for people of different religions to live together peacefully and as
equals. They would of course disarm captured Israeli soldiers but also make it
clear to them that they viewed the conflict as one between sides #1 and #2, not
Jews versus Arabs.
American Indians won over a lot of European-descended prisoners by treating them
exactly this way in the 1700s and 1800s. If Hezbollah adopted this strategy,
word would spread about how Hezbollah was treating side #1 civilians and
captured soldiers. And Israeli civilians would grasp soon enough that they were
not considered the enemy but actually potential friends by Hezbollah. The
Israeli government's ability to rally the Israeli population to support a war
against Hezbollah would be undermined enormously, in sharp contrast to the way
it presently enjoys maximum support for a war it has convinced its population is
in self-defense.
If Hezbollah followed this strategy it would also gain greater support from
non-Palestinians in Lebanon, who would be inspired by the side #1 objectives,
and who would see that Hezbollah was not waging a religious war.
What would class war violence look like for
Hamas?
Hamas apparently has less powerful weapons than Hezbollah. But the strategy
would be the same. Hamas would stop trying to kill random non-combatants in
Israeli towns near Gaza with its missiles, and instead it would direct all the
violence it could muster against Israeli combatants who directly oppress people
in Gaza: the Israeli military forces that control Gaza's borders and sea coast.
The military objective would be to make it as hard as possible for the Israeli
military to control the Gaza borders. Hamas, instead of telling Gazans that
"we'll do the fighting for you," would help ordinary Gazans contribute to this
violence against Israeli border guards, even if only by throwing rocks, as they
were obviously able to do in past intifadahs. If territory in Israel adjacent to
Gaza could be captured and Israeli civilians residing in it treated
respectfully, all the better.
The aims of the violence would be to defeat the military forces that deny
Palestinians their right to return and their right to live as the equals of Jews
in their own country. Hamas and Hezbollah would subordinate their use of
violence to the strategy of uniting ordinary Arabs and Jews and others for their
mutual security and support and against Zionism and all other forms of racial,
religious or ethnic inequality. These aims would become evident to Israeli
civilians, and the Israeli government would not be nearly as able to convince
Israelis that their lives were threatened by Hamas as they are able to do today.
The opposition inside Israel to the government would be able to take the
offense, instead of being on the defensive ideologically as they are today.
Doubts within the ranks of the Israeli army itself would spread, just as they
did within the U.S. army in Vietnam. The U.S. had to retreat from Vietnam
because American rulers realized that they could not count on the army to fight
any more. This could happen to the Israli army if they understood that the only
thing they were fighting for was side #2 against side #1.
How would class war affect the American
public's support for Israel?
If Hamas and Hezbollah fought the class war along these lines, certainly the
media and politicians would try to disguise the fact, but some of the truth
would get through. To the extent that it did, it would transform the mindset of
the American public about the Middle East. Instead of falling for the propaganda
about Israel defending its people against terrorists, the American working class
would recognize that Hamas and Hezbollah were fighting for working class values
against the same kind of upper class people that American workers have to fight
at home on the job and in their communities. The American government would have
a hard time convincing Americans that it was right to support Israel.
Why don't Hamas and Hezbollah fight the class
war?
Good question. I hope Palestinians start asking it, because the
Palestinians, as part of side #1, can actually win this fight. It is simply a
tragedy to lose it.
John Spritzler is the author of
The People As Enemy: The
Leaders' Hidden Agenda In World War II, and a Research Scientist at the
Harvard School of Public Health.
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